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ABSTRACT: American state legislatures have evolved dramatically throughout their 
history.  In particular, the structures, rules and procedures governing the operations 
legislatures have changed significantly over the course of the 20th and 21st Centuries.  The 
purpose of this paper is to present a theoretical framework for studying the development 
and evolution of American state legislatures.  We then apply that framework to the case of 
constitutional provisions impacting the legislative branch in Ohio and conclude that the 
initial decision to invest significant authority in the legislative branch significantly 
impacted the evolution of legislative evolution and development in the state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper prepared for presentation at the 2012 meeting of the State Politics and Policy 
Conference, Rice University/University of Houston, February 16-18. 
1  
 
Introduction 
 Scholars have been long fascinated by the evolution and development of legislatures 
in the United States.  Understanding the origins and evolution of these governing 
institutions is an important, but often understudied topic at the American state level.  A 
better appreciation of the foundations and development of governing institutions has 
significant implications for fully understanding the policies adopted by those serving in 
these institutions. 
Quite a lot is known about how Congress and its structures have developed and 
evolved over time. Countless books and journal articles have focused on the development 
of congressional committee systems (Shepsle 1986; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Baron 
and Ferejohn 1989; Maass 1983; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990; Krehbiel 1991; 
Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Maltzman 1997), political party 
structures (Rohde 1994; Aldrich 1995), leadership (Davidson, Hammond and Smock 1998; 
Peabody 1967, 1984; Peters 1997; Cooper and Brady 1981b; Sinclair 1999; Evans and 
Oleszek 1999, 2004; Ripley 1967) and procedural rules (Bach and Smith 1988; Sinclair 
1994; Krehbiel 1991, 1997; Dion and Huber 1997; Binder and Smith 1997; Binder 1997; 
Dion 1997).  Other works have addressed generally the process of congressional 
institutionalization (Polsby 1968; Froman 1968; Davidson and Oleszek 1976). 
Disproportionately less scholarly attention has been given to the evolution and 
development of state legislatures.  Many of the studies of state legislative evolution and 
development that do exist were conducted long ago and typically focus on the development 
of a legislative institution in a single state (Lewis 1952; Rosenthal 1968). More modern 
explorations of state legislatures have focused on explaining institutional differences 
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across state legislatures, with little attempt to track institutions over time or determine the 
evolution of these institutional differences (Rosenthal 1973; 1974; 1997; 2004; 2008; 
Francis 1989). Recently in 101 Chambers: Congress, State Legislatures and the Future of 
Legislative Studies, Peverill Squire and Keith Hamm outline how American state legislatures 
have come to differ from one another as well as Congress over time.  They end their book 
by challenging future scholars to explain the causes or evolution of these differences, and 
Squire has undertaken the task of exploring the evolution of American state legislatures 
from the pre-colonial to modern period in a forthcoming text. 
Our goal in this paper is to present a case-study of the state of Ohio that is part of a 
larger project that aims to explore how constitutional and statutory law have influenced 
the development of state legislative institutions.  Our central contention in this work is that 
the evolution and development of American state legislatures is path-dependent in nature, 
and that the institutions and norms that guide the legislative process in the states today is 
highly contingent upon past historical events and the choices made by past legislators and 
citizens in reaction to relevant events.  Choices made concerning institutional design in 
American state legislatures have been driven by events both exogenous and endogenous to 
the bodies as well as the behavior and reactions of the individuals within those bodies, and 
future choices concerning institutional design will be constrained by these past choices. 
 This paper will proceed as follows – first, we will discuss common theories 
regarding changing legislative institutions.  Second, we will discuss in more detail our 
theory regarding the roles of path dependency and bounded rationality in the development 
of state legislatures.  We will then proceed by applying this theory to the case of Ohio.  We 
will finish by providing some concluding observations. 
3  
 
Institutionalization and Change: The Stickiness of Institutional Arrangements 
 Institutionalized structures are a vital component of an effective governing system.  
Nelson Polsby made this assertion in his work regarding the institutionalization of the U.S. 
House of Representatives (Polsby 1968).  In this work he asserts: 
 
“Most people who study politics are in general agreement, it seems to me, on 
at least two propositions.  First, we agree that for a political system to be 
viable, for it to succeed in performing tasks of authoritative resource 
allocation, problem solving, conflict settlement, and so on, in behalf of a 
population of any substantial size, it must be institutionalized.  That is to say, 
organizations must be created and sustained that are specialized to political 
activity.  Otherwise, the political system is likely to be unstable, weak and 
incapable of servicing the demands or protecting the interests of the 
constituent groups.  Secondly, it is generally agreed that for a political system 
to be in some sense free and democratic, means must be found for 
institutionalizing representativeness with all the diversity that this implies, 
and for legitimizing yet at the same time containing political opposition 
within the system (Polsby, 1968:  144).” 
 
During this period much of the research concerning Congress focused on identifying 
and explaining the causes and patterns in the institutionalization of legislative structures 
and procedures (Froman 1968; Cooper 1988; Davidson and Oleszek 1976; see Schickler 
2001 for an in-depth discussion of the institutionalization of Congress).  Common to many 
of these studies is the notion that the creation and institutionalization of structures and 
procedures is closely tied to forces both inside and outside the legislative environment.  
Many of the ideas presented in this work were borrowed from organizational theory. 
In particular, scholars focusing their studies on the state legislatures championed 
the ability of organizational theory to be adapted to the study of the legislative process.  For 
example, Hedlund writes that 
 
4  
 
Collectively this work demonstrates, first, that concepts derived from 
organizational theory can be applied to legislatures.  These concepts include 
organizational autonomy, division of labor, task environment, organizational 
technology, “buffering” between inputs and outputs, institutional 
“imperatives”, organizational uncertainty, adaptation, consolidation, 
organizational elaboration, organizational productivity, organizational 
expeditiousness and organizational efficiency (Hedlund 1984). 
 
 The bulk of the of research applying organizational theory to the study of 
legislatures argues that in order to survive, a legislative body must change its practices and 
procedures in reaction to changes in the legislature’s external and internal environments 
(Froman 1968; Davidson and Oleszek 1976; Moncrief and Jewell 1980; Cooper and Brady 
1981a; Thompson and Moncrief 1992).  Legislative scholars have used this perspective to 
successfully study the existence of and changes in legislative institutions (Cooper 1977, 
1981; Cooper and Brady 1981a; Hedlund and Freeman 1981; Moncrief and Jewell 1980; 
Harder and Davis 1979; Hedlund 1978; Hedlund and Hamm 1976, 1977, 1978; Davidson 
and Oleszek 1976; Froman 1968).   
 Specifically these studies have tested hypotheses developed from organizational 
theory and find that legislative organizations adapt in reaction to stress and strain from 
their internal and external environments (Davidson and Oleszek 1976).   These studies 
identify two types of change occurring in legislatures: adaptation and consolidation.  
Adaptation occurs when legislative structures and procedures are changed in reaction to 
changes in the external environments.  In contrast, consolidation occurs when legislative 
structures and procedures are changed to deal with internal stresses (Davidson and 
Oleszek 1976; Thompson and Moncrief 1992).  Additionally, these external strains may 
cause internal stresses by changing the incentive structure of the institution’s members.  
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This change in member incentive structures may ultimately lead to changes in the body’s 
internal structures and procedures (Katz and Sala 1996; Binder and Smith 1997, 1998).  
 It must be noted that the process of institutionalization and subsequent alterations 
in adopted institutions is not a process that occurs quickly.  Rather, institutions take quite 
some time to evolve and once institutionalized are not easily or quickly altered (Polsby 
1968; Froman 1968; Davidson and Oleszek 1976).  Thus, institutions can be clearly 
described as “sticky” in the sense that once adopted and entrenched they are very difficult 
to “shake.”   
Bounded by the Past: Path-Dependency and Institutional Change1 
Institutionalization and change rarely occurs in a vacuum.  Where an institution 
starts greatly influences where it can go.  That is to say, that the ability to adopt new 
institutional structures and procedures or alter existing ones is highly dependent upon 
earlier choices regarding institutional development.  Scholars who have addressed 
institutional adoption and change seem to acknowledge this limitation.   
For example, in their discussion of institutional change in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Davidson and Oleszek (1976) assert: “History is strewn with examples of 
one generation’s reforms which exacerbate the next generation’s problems (1976: 38).”  
Further, C. Lawrence Evans in a literature review of scholarship regarding rule and 
structural arrangements in Congress asserts that “important areas of structural 
development within Congress appear to exhibit significant path dependencies, in which 
                                                        
1 This section is largely taken from a conference paper drafted by the authors in 2009: Martorano Miller, 
Nancy, Ronald D. Hedlund and Keith E. Hamm.  2009.  “Paths, Events and Strategic Choices:The Evolution of 
American State Legislatures,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, September, Toronto, ON, Canada. 
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current decisions about rules are shaped and constrained by previous episodes of 
procedural choice (Evans 1999: 632).”  
 More recently, scholars have asserted that political processes are by their nature 
path dependent and that any attempt to account for phenomenon associated with these 
processes must take this path dependency into account (Pierson 2004; Jervis 2000; Thelen 
2000; Bridges 2000).  Comparative politics scholars studying democratization and the 
adoption of other governing institutions as well as scholars studying American political 
development have long acknowledged the importance of path dependency in their work 
(e.g., Lipset and Rokkan 1967; North 1990; Schickler 2001; Skocpol 1992; Collier and 
Collier 1991; Ertman 1996; Hacker 1998). 
 Paul Pierson has been the most vocal advocate for correctly including temporality or 
path dependence into explanations of political processes.  Pierson states: 
“The notion of path dependence is generally used to support a few key 
claims: Specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; starting from similar 
conditions, a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; large 
consequences may result from relatively “small” or contingent events; 
particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to 
reverse; and consequently, political development is often punctuated by 
critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life 
(Collier and Collier 1991; Ikenberry 1994; Krasner 1989).  All these features 
stand in sharp contrast to prominent modes of argument and explanation in 
political science, which attributes “large” outcomes to “large” causes and 
emphasize the prevalence of unique, predictable political outcomes, the 
irrelevance of timing and sequence, and the capacity of rational actors to 
design and implement optimal solutions (given their resources and 
constraints) to the problems that confront them (Pierson 2000a: 251).”  
 
Pierson’s reference to “large” causes accounting for “large” outcomes is aimed in 
part at rational choice scholars who assert that the choices made regarding institutions in 
political processes have been done purposely by individuals who choose the institutional 
7  
 
arrangements that best suit their needs.  For example, in the congressional literature three 
schools of thought exist regarding the purpose of committees in the legislative process.  
Each school treats members as rational actors with a specific purpose for the committee 
system.  The distributive school asserts that the committee system exists as a venue for 
individual members to secure reelection by securing benefits for their constituents 
(Sheplse 1986; Weingast and Marshall 1988).  The informational school asserts that the 
purpose of the committee system is to reduce information costs for members and thus 
make the legislative process more efficient by reducing uncertainty over outcomes in the 
legislative process (Krehbiel 1991).  Finally, the partisan school suggests that the purpose 
of the committee system is to secure the power and future success of the majority political 
party through agenda control (Cox and McCubbins 1993).   
 Common to these three schools of thought is the notion that the past simply does 
not matter – what is important are the objectives sought by the relevant actors for the 
institution.  In fact, most studies that address institutional structure and procedure through 
a rational choice perspective assume that structures and procedures will change if those 
who have control over them discover that a different configuration of structures and 
procedures will allow them to more efficiently attain their goals.  Very little consideration 
is given to the notion that change in certain directions may not be possible or that options 
for change may be tied to decisions made long ago. 
 In his work, Pierson makes two important assertions.  First, he argues that it isn’t 
always “large” events that lead to “large” outcomes.  Rather, a “small” event can have a 
significant impact or lead to a “large” outcome.  Secondly, he asserts that simply stating that 
the present situation is informed by the past is not enough; rather he argues our theories 
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need to account for why, where and how the past has informed the present (Pierson 2000a, 
2000b). 
 The notion of path dependency means that we must go farther than saying “history 
matters.”  In order to understand the significance of a variable/institution/process in the 
present, it is necessary that we understand how the variable/institution/process got there 
in the first place – the path it took (Pierson 2000a).  When considering the placing of an 
institution or political process in time several concepts must be taken into account.  We 
must come to understand the impact of critical junctures, sequencing, events, time 
horizons, duration, timing, and unintended consequences on the path of the institution or 
process of interest. The ability to analyze an institution or political process in this manner 
will greatly enhance our understanding of that institution or process (Pierson 2000b). 
 An important component of path dependency is how “increasing returns “dynamics 
influence the ability of institutional structures and processes to evolve over time.  
Increasing returns dynamics are positive feedback processes that 1) illustrate how and 
why the costs of altering institutions will increase over time; and 2) help draw attention to 
timing and sequencing issues by distinguishing between formative moments from periods 
that reinforce divergent paths (Pierson 2000a).  Pierson writes: 
“This conception of path dependence, in which preceding steps in a 
particular direction induce further movement in the same direction, is well 
captured by the idea of increasing returns.  In an increasing returns process, 
the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each 
move down that path.  This is because the relative benefits of the current 
activity compared with other possible options increase over time.  To put it a 
different way, the costs of exit – of switching to some previously plausible 
alternative – rise (Pierson 2000a: 252).”   
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Therefore, early decisions concerning the adoption of institutional structures and 
procedures will greatly influence the ability of future actors to adopt new structures and 
institutions and/or alter existing ones.  Previous work on institutional design has alluded 
to this concept when it asserts that there are high costs to the creation of new institutions 
in the form of learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations, resulting in 
an increase in the attractiveness of existing institutional structures (Pierson 2000a; North 
1990).  In the end, political actors are more likely to stick with potentially inefficient 
institutions due to the high costs of changing existing structures. 
 The following example illustrates how scholars have incorporated path dependency 
into their explanations of institutional development and evolution.  Eric Shickler (2001) in 
his analysis of the institutional development of the U.S. Congress makes a number of claims 
concerning the forces of change in congressional structures and processes.  One of his 
claims is that congressional institutions develop via the layering of structures/processes 
that are informed by the competing motives of different groups of members – thus new 
structures are often layered over old structures.  He goes on to assert that the choices 
available for new institutions are dependent upon prior choices. Hence, it is easier to adopt 
a new institution than it is to change an existing institution as existing institutions have too 
much support from those that benefit from them as they are.   
To illustrate this claim, Schickler references the creation of budget committees in 
1974.  These committees were meant to provide integrated fiscal policy.  However, since 
these committees were superimposed onto the existing structure of authorization, 
appropriations and revenue committees, they had difficulty succeeding because those who 
had an entrenched interest in the existing structures had no incentive to see the budget 
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committees’ work.  The point here is that if it had been possible to start anew, it is highly 
unlikely that a system would be adopted that gave control over this process to a three-
layered system of committees.  But since too many members of Congress had vested 
interests in power bases of the existing committees, there was no alternative but to layer 
the new structure on top of the old.  Thus, choices available to reform congressional 
structures in this example were in fact constrained by choices made in the past (Schickler 
2001). 
To our knowledge no published studies to date have attempted to apply these 
principles to the development of state legislatures.  However, Peverill Squire is currently 
drafting a manuscript that highlights the importance of “where” a state legislature begins 
tremendously influences how it will evolve over time.  Specifically, he argues that the path 
that a state took to statehood (e.g., original colony, territory to state, or direct admittance) 
has a significant impact on the legislatures’ evolution and development over time (Squire, 
2012). 
 
Path Dependency, Significant Events, and Constrained Choices2 
The goal of this present endeavor is to develop a theory of institutional development 
and evolution for American state legislatures which can be applied to the evolution of any 
aspect of state legislatures.  We propose that elements of path dependency, organizational 
                                                        
2 This section is largely taken from a conference paper drafted by the authors in 2009: Martorano Miller, 
Nancy, Ronald D. Hedlund and Keith E. Hamm.  2009.  “Paths, Events and Strategic Choices:The Evolution of 
American State Legislatures,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, September, Toronto, ON, Canada. 
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theory, and rational choice theory interact to account for the development and evolution of 
institutional structures and processes at the state-level. 
How the institutional structures and processes that compose a legislative body 
develop and evolve is certainly related to its starting point.  It is not likely the case that the 
members of an institution would simply abandon existing structures and processes and 
start from scratch every time reform is warranted.  History proves that this is in fact the 
case.  The legislative institutions and processes adopted by colonists resembled the 
legislative institutions and processes of Great Britain.  Further, the structures and 
processes adopted by the American state legislatures closely resemble those adopted by 
colonists.  Finally, the basic structures and processes adopted for the U.S. Congress were 
also greatly informed by the colonial and early state legislative experiences (Squire and 
Hamm 2005).  Clearly, the development and evolution of American state legislatures has 
been greatly influenced by the past experiences of those members serving in them. 
This is not to imply that once adopted a legislative structure or process cannot be 
abandoned, altered or newly created.  Path dependence does not “freeze” institutional 
structures and processes in place – all it does is constrain the potential options for change 
by limiting the available alternative institutional structures and procedures (Pierson 
2000b). 
The development and evolution of legislative structures and procedures will also be 
influenced by – to use Pierson’s (2000a) terminology – events both large and small.  In 
order to survive as an organization, these legislative bodies will have to adapt and 
consolidate institutional structures and procedures in ways that will allow it to maintain 
itself.  These events can be of such magnitude that they impact virtually all state 
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legislatures or they can be influential in just one or a small number of state legislatures.  An 
example of an event that impacted virtually all state legislatures was the mandatory 
apportionment of legislatures that occurred in the mid-1960s.  The one-man, one-vote 
decision greatly changed the composition of the membership within virtually every state 
legislature.  Many state legislatures increased the size of their chambers in order to comply 
with the order while others choose some different path of accommodation (Squire and 
Hamm 2005).   
Events may dictate when institutional structures and procedures need to be 
reformed, and path dependency may constrain the choice set of possible reforms, but the 
concepts of rational choice can still be applied to the decisions made regarding institutional 
structures and procedures in legislatures.  The difference is that the members of the 
legislature will have to choose from a “bounded” set of options.  Just because the choice set 
is limited, does not mean that members cannot be strategic with the choices they make.  
The members of the legislature will still adopt those institutional structures and 
procedures that will allow them to best attain their goals in the legislative process.   
The area of minority party procedural rights provides one example where rational 
choice theory can intersect with path dependence.  In the congressional literature there are 
two theories concerning when a legislative body will choose to expand/contract the ability 
of the minority party to potentially obstruct or influence the legislative process.  One school 
of thought asserts that minority party procedural rights will be expanded when the size 
(and thus strength) of the majority political party is small.  Minority party procedural rights 
are expanded because the majority party fears that it will soon be in the minority and 
hopes that if it expands minority rights now, reciprocity will rule in the future (Binder 
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1997).  The other school of thought asserts that minority party procedural rights will be 
contracted when the size (and thus strength) of the majority political party is small and 
acting cohesively.  The goal now is to restrict the ability of the minority party to obstruct or 
influence the process in an effort for the majority party to protect its advantage in future 
electoral contests (Dion 1997).  These theories have been tested to some extent at the state 
legislative level with the first school receiving more empirical support (Martorano 2004).  
The expansion/contraction of minority party procedural rights is accomplished by slightly 
altering structures and procedures that already exist – such as the committee system, 
debate rules, etc. rather than creating new institutions.  The purpose of this example is to 
show that change and alteration of structures and procedures informed by rational choice 
principles is still possible, even when the available choices may be constrained.  We will 
now apply these concepts to the case of Ohio by exploring the evolution of Article II 
(Legislature) of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
Territorial Government Oppression: Progressivism and the Ohio Constitution 
The state of Ohio was the seventeenth state admitted into the union in 1803.  Ohio 
was one of five states carved from the Northwest Territory which was created by the 
Northwest Ordinance in 1787.3  The Northwest Ordinance laid out a staged process for 
transitioning from a territory to a state.  In stage one, the territory was to be governed by a 
governor, secretary and judiciary all appointed by the Continental Congress.  Once a 
territory reached a population of 5,000 free, male adults, it could enter stage two.  In stage 
                                                        
3 The other four states were: Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin. 
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two, the territory could elect representatives to a general assembly.  The territorial 
governor as well as a five-member legislative council appointed by Congress would also be 
included.  Bills passed by the general assembly could be vetoed by the governor with no 
ability for the legislature to overturn.  The third stage, statehood occurred once the 
population reached 60,000 free, male adults.  A territory could be granted statehood with a 
population less than 60,000 through an act of Congress (Steinglass and Scarselli, 2004).   
Since its admittance to the union, the state of Ohio has had four constitutional 
conventions.  Two of these conventions resulted in the original and a new constitution 
(1802 and 1851), one produced a new constitution that failed to be ratified by the citizenry 
(1873-74), and the final constitutional convention (1912) led to significant changes to the 
Constitution of 1851 via the adoption of thirty-four separate amendments.  Additionally, 
the 1851 Constitution has been amended many times via action initiated by the general 
assembly or the people (Steinglass and Scarselli 2004). 
Steven H. Steinglass and Gino J. Scarselli (2004) have drafted a thorough history of 
the evolution of Ohio constitutional law.  They have asserted that the most significant 
events with regards to the state’s constitutional document – the initial adoption in 1802, 
the new Constitution of 1851 and the amendments following the Constitutional Convention 
of 1912 – were driven largely by past experiences as well as political forces at work at the 
time.  Steinglass and Scarselli (2004) explain that the initial constitution adopted in 1802 
was inspired largely by the recently drafted constitutions of Tennessee, Kentucky and 
Pennsylvania.  However, they argue that when compared on the whole to the constitutions 
of these states, Ohio’s constitution was “a much more radically democratic document 
(Steinglass and Scarselli 2004: 16).”   
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In fact, the 1802 Constitution vested nearly all government power into the 
legislative branch.  This was a conscious decision on the part of the Ohioans sitting at the 
Constitutional Convention of 1802.  This decision to vest inordinate, unchecked power in 
the legislative branch was made in reaction to the territorial government experience of 
those settling the area between the adoption of the Northwest Ordinance in 1787 and the 
granting of statehood in 1803.  During this period, the battle was raging nationally between 
the Federalists and the Jeffersonian Republicans.  The Federalists desired to maintain 
strong federal government control in the new territories to the west, while the Jeffersonian 
Republicans desired a more decentralized governing arrangement.  The settlers in what 
would become Ohio were largely Scotch-Irish settlers from Pennsylvania and Virginia.  
These settlers were committed to individual freedom and economic independence – thus 
they were more inclined to support the ideals of the Jeffersonian Republicans over the 
Federalists (Steinglass and Scarselli 2004). 
Unfortunately for the settlers of the Ohio Territory, the Congress-appointed 
governor, Arthur St. Clair, was an ardent Federalist.  The settlers of the Ohio territory were 
not fans of St. Clair’s autocratic governing style.  The real trouble began after the 
establishment of the territorial legislature – St. Clair routinely vetoed the legislation passed 
by the body.  As the Jeffersonian Republicans gained political strength, and Jefferson was 
elected president, Ohio’s territorial political leaders petitioned Congress for an enabling act 
and admittance to the union as a full-fledged state.  Thus, fearful of a powerful governor, 
the 1802 Constitution gave the legislature the power to make law without interference 
from the executive branch, the power to appoint almost all civil officers and judges, 
apportion itself, create new counties, and act on anything else not specifically prohibited by 
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the Constitution (Steinglass and Scarselli 2004).4  Thus, to use Pierson’s (2004) 
terminology, a “large” event – oppression by a Federalist territorial governor – significantly 
colored how Ohio chose to initially organize its legislature. 
 While this all powerful legislature ensured that a single official in the form of the 
governor could not overturn the will of the people (i.e., the legislature), vesting that much 
authority in one institution of governance without any institutional check on that authority 
proved to be problematic.  Some of the issues that emerged were unrestricted spending 
and the creation of an enormous state debt, using the ability to create counties and appoint 
county judges as a form of political patronage as well as enacting unnecessary legislation as 
a mechanism for elongating sessions and increasing legislator compensation.  There were 
also issues with regards to judicial inefficiency as well as the difficult process for amending 
the constitution (Steinglass and Scarselli 2004).  In his work on path dependency, Pierson 
(2004) addresses that the path taken may result in unintended consequences.  In Ohio’s 
case, there were substantial unintended consequences for creating an extremely powerful 
legislative branch.  Over time, the body became quite corrupt.  To further exasperate the 
issue, the initial constitution made amending the document extremely difficult.  In fact, 
change would not come until thirteen years after the initial calls for it. 
 The impetus to finally make changes to the constitution came in the wake of the 
Panic of 1837, which resulted in the failure of a number of banks.  Citizens in Ohio blamed 
the panic on the legislature’s banking and fiscal policies.  At this time, there was also a push 
                                                        
4The delegation sent to Washington D.C. to lobby for Ohio’s admittance as a state was sent with a drafted 
constitution to use a proof that the territory was ready for statehood.  Turns out it was unnecessary as the 
Jeffersonian-Republicans in D.C. were more than happy to admit a Jeffersonian-Republican dominated 
territory to the Union. 
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to revise constitutions in a number of states that were experiencing economic and 
structural problems similar to those occurring in Ohio.   It took supporters of constitutional 
revision thirteen years to muster the necessary two-thirds vote in the legislature to pass a 
resolution calling for a constitutional convention because during this time period 
legislative power was split evenly between the Whigs and Jacksonian Democrats.  Thus, 
both parties were more concerned with securing the next election and control of the 
legislature than instigating constitutional revision.  Ultimately, a coalition of Whigs and 
Free Soil Party legislators adopted the resolution and the voters overwhelmingly 
supported the convening of a constitutional convention in May 1850 (Steinglass and 
Scarselli 2004).  The somewhat lengthy wait for revisions between 1837 and 1850 
provides evidence for Pierson’s (2004) arguments regarding the role of increasing returns.  
From the time of constitutions adoption in 1802 until the Panic of 1837, the institutions in 
place had become quite entrenched and there were many that benefitted from those 
institutions.  Despite calls for reform, it appears that there was quite a bit of reluctance to 
make alterations.  
The primary purpose of the 1851 Constitutional Convention was to scale back the 
significant power held by the legislature.  Several reforms were adopted that achieved this 
goal.  First, the power to appoint executive branch officials and judges was taken away, and 
these offices became elected positions. Second, the ability of the legislature to pass 
legislation regarding economic and special matters was significantly curtailed. And finally, 
the 1851 Constitution limited the ability of the legislature to apportion house and senate 
districts.  Additionally, the revised document mandated that legislator compensation be 
fixed by law, ending the practice of extending the session just to increase compensation and 
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established biennial rather than annual sessions to decrease the enactment of unnecessary 
legislation.  Despite these significant reductions in legislative authority, the executive and 
judicial branches were not strengthened.  In fact, even though additional offices (lieutenant 
governor, auditor, treasurer and attorney general) were added to the executive branch, the 
governor was still not afforded any veto power over legislative decision-making (Steinglass 
and Scarselli 2004). The lack of a gubernatorial veto provides more evidence of the path 
dependency of institutional design – fifty years later and the experiences of territorial 
governance continued to influence decision-making with regards to the balance between 
legislative and executive branch power. 
Another constitutional convention was convened in 1873-74.  The revised 
constitution that emerged from that convention failed to be ratified by the voters.  The 
primary reason for the convention was to alter the provisions of the judicial branch, which 
suffered from sufficient workload and inefficiency issues.  Several alterations impacting the 
legislative branch were also proposed.  These included the veto power for the governor, 
requiring a recorded yea/nay vote on any appropriation item if requested by any legislator, 
and prohibiting anyone interested in a state contract from becoming a legislator (Steinglass 
and Scarselli 2004). 
 No significant changes would again be made to Article II (Legislative Branch) until 
1903, when the Governor was finally given the power to veto legislation passed by the 
General Assembly.  This was a proposal that originated in the General Assembly and was 
approved by the voters.  A gubernatorial veto could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of 
both chambers (Steinglass and Scarselli 2004).  
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 Ohio held its final constitutional convention in 1912.  This convention was part of a 
larger movement nationwide instigated by the Progressive movement to give citizens a 
more direct voice in government.  However, rather than completely redraft and put forth a 
new constitution for voter ratification, the participants opted to put forth a series of 
amendments to the 1851 Constitution.  The participants at this convention learned from 
the experience of the 1874 convention.  In that case, the voters clearly were not willing to 
completely abandon the existing constitution, and thus the 1912 convention opted to 
propose amendments to the 1851 Constitution rather than draft a new document.  Forty-
two amendments were proposed and thirty-four were adopted by the voters.  One of the 
most significant amendments regarded the adoption of the initiative and referendum.  
Citizens were now able to propose amendments to the constitution and pass judgment on 
laws passed by the general assembly.  This was the only amendment that dealt generally 
with legislative structure and procedures.  The other amendments altering Article II dealt 
largely with granting the legislature the power to legislate with regards to allowing certain 
professions to place liens on property with regards to payment, regulating the hours and 
pay for employees working on public projects, providing for the removal of public officials 
from office, regulating the use of expert witnesses and testimony in criminal trials and 
proceedings and registering, transferring, insuring and guaranteeing land titles (Steinglass 
and Scarselli 2004). 
A number of amendments were passed following those that came out of the 1912 
Convention.  The major changes that impacted the legislative branch included amendments 
that increased senate terms from two to four years (1956) and an amendment via citizen 
petition that limited the terms of state house members and legislatures (1992).  
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Additionally, the legislative article of the constitution was reorganized in 1973 largely 
through the amendment process – these amendments did not result in many significant 
changes to legislative structure and process.  The only change of interest was that the 
addition that the presiding officers of both chambers could call the legislature into special 
session.   Prior to 1973, only the governor possessed that power (Steinglass and Scarselli 
2004). 
 
Path Dependency, Rationality and the Case of Ohio 
 Clearly path dependent forces have impacted the evolution of Article II of Ohio’s 
constitution.  Specifically, in Ohio there were a series of critical junctures that led to the 
initial organization of the legislature as well as changes to its structures and procedures.  
The first and possibly most significant was the experience of the citizenry under territorial 
governance.  Significant repression by an authoritarian territorial governor led to the new 
state establishing an extremely powerful legislative body that was left largely unchecked by 
the other branches of government.  Further, the territorial government experience as well 
as Ohio’s admittance as a state was set within the larger context of the national power 
struggle between the Federalists and the Jeffersonian-Republicans.   
This initial decision regarding the relative power of the legislative branch would 
have a number of unintended consequences that would endure and impact future 
alterations to structures and procedures.  Specifically, the resulting corrupt legislative 
practices led to significant calls from citizens to reign in the power of the institution.  
However, given the difficulty of amending the constitution as well as the legislators’ desire 
to maintain an institution that benefitted them (i.e., they were acting rationaly), it took 
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many years for reform to actually occur.  Further, while the changes did limit the power of 
the legislature, it did little to provide any real check (e.g., gubernatorial veto) on legislative 
action. 
The Progressive Movement of the early twentieth century provided a second critical 
juncture.  Progressives were able to secure support for a constitutional convention in 1912 
that led to increased power for the people via the adoption of the initiative and 
referendum.  The citizens of Ohio could now serve as a check on legislative power with 
their ability to directly alter the constitution as well as their ability to hold referendum 
votes on legislative activity. Article II has rarely been amended though the initiative 
process.  However, when Ohioans have chosen to exercise this power, the citizen’s have 
used it to restrict the power of the legislature.  Most notably, in 1992 the terms of state 
legislatures were limited via the citizen initiative process.5  Ohioans have also rarely used 
their referenda power.  In 2011, citizens overturned a controversial law that would have 
severely limited the ability of public employee unions to collectively bargain. 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 Our plans for future research are to explore two other cases in detail – Rhode Island 
and Texas.  Rhode Island provides a case where we can explore how status as one of the 
original thirteen colonies impacted the evolution of constitutional language regarding the 
                                                        
5 Every twenty years, the citizen’s of Ohio are required to decide whether or not they wish to convene a 
constitutional convention – citizens have chosen not to exercise this power since 1912.  However, in the 
1970s the citizens opted for a constitutional review commission that proposed a number of constitutional 
amendments.  Interestingly, this year citizens are required to decide on a constitutional convention.  Most are 
recommending a constitutional review commission and many are calling for that commission to repeal term 
limits, arguing that term limits have led to the unintended consequence of actually increasing the power of 
special interests in the state.  
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legislative branch, while Texas provides a case where we can explore these settings in the 
context of direct admittance to Union as a state.  We also hope to be able to extend this 
analysis to statutory law.   
Clearly, the path that Ohio took to statehood influenced the evolution and 
development of its governing institutions.  The initial decision to vest supreme power in 
the legislative branch led to serious consequences that impacted the state in many ways 
and for a very long time.  Once the state started down that path, it was very difficult to alter 
course.  Even when there was support for reform, those making changes had a limited 
choice of acceptable options for change.  The source of the change also matters.  Alterations 
from constitutional conventions and through citizen initiative often reigned in the power of 
the legislature.  Those instigated by the legislature itself for voter approval sometimes 
limited their power in small ways (the exception being the gubernatorial veto) and 
sometimes actually worked to the benefit of the legislature.  The case of Ohio provides 
compelling evidence that appreciating how an institution has evolved and developed is 
vital to understanding that institution and its impact. 
 Further, these findings call into question many of our theories regarding legislative 
structure and procedure.  Many of our theories – especially those at the congressional level 
– are rooted in rational choice tradition.  Therefore, the central assumption of these 
theories is that the structures and procedures that exist in the legislature are there because 
the members want and need them to fulfill their goals, and can be altered whenever 
necessary. The evidence presented regarding Ohio indicate that this may not always be 
true.  This forces us to ask ourselves a series of questions including: how valid/applicable 
are these theories to state legislatures if this basic assumption regarding institutional 
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adoption and alteration is simply not true? Can we continue to apply congressional 
theories to state legislative research as long as we make the appropriate alterations?  Or, do 
we need to begin to construct theories with regards to state legislative institutions that are 
unique to the state legislative setting?  At this time we do not have the definitive answers to 
these questions, but they are questions that we are pondering and that all who study state 
legislative institutions must now consider.  
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